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We investigate the role of uncertainty in business cycles. First, we demonstrate that
microeconomic uncertainty rises sharply during recessions, including during the Great
Recession of 2007–2009. Second, we show that uncertainty shocks can generate drops
in gross domestic product of around 2.5% in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous firms. However, we also find that uncertainty shocks need
to be supplemented by first-moment shocks to fit consumption over the cycle. So our
data and simulations suggest recessions are best modelled as being driven by shocks
with a negative first moment and a positive second moment. Finally, we show that in-
creased uncertainty can make first-moment policies, like wage subsidies, temporarily
less effective because firms become more cautious in responding to price changes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
UNCERTAINTY has received substantial attention recently. For example, the Federal Open
Market Committee minutes repeatedly emphasize uncertainty as a key factor in the 2001
and 2007–2009 recessions. This paper seeks to evaluate the role of uncertainty for busi-
ness cycles in two parts. In the first part, we develop new empirical measures of uncer-
tainty using detailed Census microdata from 1972–2011 and we highlight three main
results. First, the dispersion of plant-level innovations to their total factor productivity
(TFP) is strongly countercyclical, rising steeply in recessions. For example, Figure 1 shows
the dispersion of TFP shocks for a balanced panel of plants during the 2 years before
the Great Recession (2005–2006) and 2 years during the recession (2008–2009). We find
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FIGURE 1.—The variance of establishment-level TFP shocks increased by 76% in the Great Recession.
Notes: Constructed from the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures using a bal-
anced panel of 15,752 establishments active in 2005–2006 and 2008–2009. TFP Shocks are defined as residuals
from a plant-level log(TFP) AR(1) regression that also includes plant and year fixed effects. Moments of
the distribution for non-recession (recession) years are: mean 0 (−0166), variance 0.198 (0.349), coefficient
of skewness −1060 (−1340) and kurtosis 15.01 (11.96). The year 2007 is omitted because according to the
NBER the recession began in 12/2007, so 2007 is not a clean “before” or “during” recession year.
that plant-level TFP shocks increased in variance by 76% during the recession. Similarly,
Figure 2 shows that the dispersion of output growth for these same establishments in-
creased even more, rising by a striking 152% during the recession. Thus, as Figures 1 and
2 suggest, recessions appear to be characterized by a negative first-moment and a positive
second-moment shock to the establishment-level driving processes.
Our second empirical finding is that uncertainty is also strongly countercyclical at the
industry level. That is, at the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) four-digit industry
level, the yearly growth rate of output is negatively correlated with the dispersion of TFP
shocks to establishments within the industry. Hence, both at the industry and at the ag-
gregate level, periods of low growth rates of output are also characterized by increased
cross-sectional dispersion of TFP shocks.
Our third empirical finding is that for plants owned by publicly traded Compustat par-
ent firms, the size of their plant-level TFP shocks is positively correlated with their par-
ents’ daily stock returns. Hence, daily stock returns volatility—a popular high-frequency
financial measure of uncertainty that also rises in recessions—is tightly linked to the size
of yearly plant TFP shocks.
Given this empirical evidence that uncertainty appears to rise sharply in recessions, in
the second part of the paper we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model. Various features of the model are specified to conform as closely as possible to the
standard frictionless real business cycle (RBC) model as this greatly simplifies compari-
son with existing work. We deviate from this benchmark in three ways. First, uncertainty
is time-varying, so the model includes shocks to both the level of technology (the first
moment) and its variance (the second moment) at both the microeconomic and macroe-
conomic levels. Second, there are heterogeneous firms that are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. Third, the model contains nonconvex adjustment costs in both capital and labor.
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FIGURE 2.—The variance of establishment-level sales growth rates increased by 152% in the Great Reces-
sion. Notes: Constructed from the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures using a
balanced panel of 15,752 establishments active in 2005–2006 and 2008–2009. Moments of the distribution for
non-recession (recession) years are: mean 0.026 (−0191), variance 0.052 (0.131), coefficient of skewness 0.164
(−0330) and kurtosis 13.07 (7.66). The year 2007 is omitted because according to the NBER the recession
began in 12/2007, so 2007 is not a clean “before” or “during” recession year.
The nonconvexities together with time variation in uncertainty imply that firms become
more cautious in investing and hiring when uncertainty increases.
The model is numerically solved and estimated using macro- and plant-level data via a
simulated method of moments (SMM) approach. Our SMM parameter estimates suggest
that micro- and macro-uncertainty increase by around threefold during recessions.
Simulations of the model allow us to study its response to an uncertainty shock. In-
creased uncertainty makes it optimal for firms to wait, leading to significant falls in hir-
ing, investment, and output. In our model, overall, uncertainty shocks generate a drop in
gross domestic product (GDP) of around 2.5%. Moreover, the increased uncertainty re-
duces productivity growth. This reduction occurs because uncertainty reduces the degree
of reallocation in the economy since productive plants pause expanding and unproduc-
tive plants pause contracting. The importance of reallocation for aggregate productivity
growth matches empirical evidence in the United States. See, for example, Foster, Halti-
wanger, and Krizan (2000, 2006), who report that reallocation broadly defined accounts
for around 50% of manufacturing and 80% of retail productivity growth in the United
States.
We then build on our theoretical model to investigate the effects of uncertainty on
policy effectiveness. We use a simple illustrative example to show how time-varying un-
certainty initially dampens the effect of an expansionary policy. The key to this policy
ineffectiveness is that a rise in uncertainty makes firms cautious in responding to any
stimulus.
Our work is related to several strands in the literature. First, we add to the extensive
literature building on the DSGE framework that studies the role of TFP shocks in caus-
ing business cycles. In this literature, recessions are generally caused by large negative
technology shocks (e.g., King and Rebelo (1999)). The reliance on negative technology
shocks has proven to be controversial, as it suggests that recessions are times of techno-
1034 BLOOM ET AL.
logical regress. As discussed above, our work provides a rationale for at least some portion
of variation in measured productivity. Countercyclical increases in uncertainty lead to a
freeze in economic activity, substantially lowering productivity growth during recessions.
Second, the paper relates to the literature on investment under uncertainty. A rapidly
growing body of work has shown that uncertainty can directly influence firm-level invest-
ment and employment in the presence of adjustment costs. Recently, the literature has
started to focus on stochastic volatility and its impacts on the economy.1 Finally, the pa-
per also builds upon a recent literature that studies the role of microeconomic rigidities
in general equilibrium macromodels.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empiri-
cal behavior of uncertainty over the business cycle. In Section 3, we formally present the
DSGE model, define the recursive equilibrium, and present our nonlinear solution al-
gorithm. We discuss the estimation of parameters governing the uncertainty process in
Section 4, while in Section 5, we study the impact of uncertainty shocks on the aggre-
gate economy. Section 6 studies the implications for government policy in the presence
of time-varying uncertainty. Section 7 concludes. Appendixes in the Supplementary Ma-
terial (Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2018)) include details on
the data (Appendix A), model solution (Appendix B), estimation (Appendix C), and a
benchmark representative agent model (Appendix D).
2. MEASURING UNCERTAINTY OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Before presenting our empirical results, it is useful to briefly discuss what we mean by
time-varying uncertainty in the context of our model.
We assume that a firm, indexed by j, produces output in period t according to the
production function
yjt =Atzjtf (kjt njt) (1)
where ktj and ntj denote idiosyncratic capital and labor employed by the firm. Each firm’s
productivity is a product of two separate processes: an aggregate component, At , and an
idiosyncratic component, zjt .
We assume that the aggregate and idiosyncratic components of business conditions fol-
low autoregressive (AR) processes:
log(At)= ρA log(At−1)+ σAt−1εt (2)
log(zjt)= ρZ log(zjt−1)+ σZt−1εjt  (3)
1For a focus on the firm level, see Bernanke (1983), Romer (1990), Bertola and Caballero (1994), Dixit
and Pindyck (1994), Abel and Eberly (1996), Hassler (1996), and Caballero and Engel (1999). For a macro-
focus, see Bloom’s (2009) partial equilibrium model with stochastic volatility, Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-
Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe’s (2011) paper on uncertainty and real exchange rates, Kehrig’s (2015)
paper on countercyclical productivity dispersion, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno’s (2014), Arellano, Bai, and
Kehoe’s (2012), and Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek’s (2014) papers on uncertainty shocks in models with finan-
cial constraints, Basu and Bundick’s (2016) paper on uncertainty shocks in a new-Keynesian model, Fernandez-
Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramirez’s (2015) paper on fiscal policy uncertainty, and
Bachmann and Bayer’s (2013, 2014) papers on microlevel uncertainty with capital adjustment costs.
2See, for example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Thomas (2002), Veracierto (2002), Gourio and
Kashyap (2007), Khan and Thomas (2008, 2013), Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel (2013), House (2014),
or Winberry (2016).
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We allow the variance of innovations, σAt and σ
Z
t , to move over time according to two-
state Markov chains, generating periods of low and high macro- and micro-uncertainty.
There are two assumptions embedded in this formulation. First, the volatility in the
idiosyncratic component, zjt , implies that productivity dispersion across firms is time-
varying, while volatility in the aggregate component, At , implies that all firms are affected
by more volatile shocks. Second, given the timing assumption in (2) and (3), firms learn
in advance that the distribution of shocks from which they will draw in the next period is
changing. This timing assumption captures the notion of uncertainty that firms face about
future business conditions.
These two shocks are driven by different statistics. Volatility in zjt implies that cross-
sectional dispersion-based measures of firm performance (output, sales, stock market re-
turns, etc.) are time-varying, while volatility in At induces higher variability in aggregate
variables like GDP growth and the Standard and Poor’s 500 index. Next we turn to our
cross-sectional and macroeconomic uncertainty measures, detailing how both appear to
rise in recessions.
2.1. Microeconomic Uncertainty Over the Business Cycle
In this section we present a set of results showing that shocks at the establishment-level,
firm-level, and industry-level all increase in variance during recessions. In our model in
Section 3 we focus on units of production, ignoring multi-establishment firms or industry-
level shocks to reduce computational burden. Nevertheless, we present data at these three
different levels to demonstrate the generality of the increase in idiosyncratic shocks dur-
ing recessions.
Our first set of measures comes from the Census panel of manufacturing establish-
ments. In summary, with extensive details in Appendix A, this data set contains de-
tailed output and input data on over 50,000 establishments from 1972 to 2011. We focus
on the subset of 15,673 establishments with 25+ years of data to ensure that compo-
sitional changes do not bias our results, generating a sample of almost half a million
establishment–year observations.
To measure uncertainty, we first calculate establishment-level TFP (̂zjt) using the stan-
dard approach from Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2000). We then define TFP shocks
(ejt) as the residual from the first-order autoregressive equation for establishment-level
log TFP,
log(̂zjt)= ρ log(̂zjt−1)+μj + λt + ejt (4)
where μj is an establishment-level fixed effect (to control for permanent establishment-
level differences) and λt is a year fixed effect (to control for cyclical shocks). Since this
residual also contains plant-level demand shocks that are not controlled for by four-digit
price deflators (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008)), our revenue-based mea-
sure will combine both TFP and demand shocks.
Finally, we define microeconomic uncertainty, σẐt−1, as the cross-sectional dispersion of
ejt calculated on a yearly basis. In Figure 3, we depict the interquartile range (IQR) of this
TFP shock within each year. As Figure 3 shows, the series exhibits a clearly countercyclical
behavior. This is particularly striking for the recent Great Recession of 2007–2009, which
displays the highest value of TFP dispersion since the series began in 1972.
Table I more systematically evaluates the relationship between the dispersion of TFP
shocks and recessions. In column 1, we regress the cross-sectional standard deviation
(S.D.) of establishment TFP shocks on an indicator for the number of quarters in a re-
cession during that year. So, for example, this variable has a value of 0.25 in 2007 as the
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FIGURE 3.—TFP “shocks” are more dispersed in recessions. Notes: Constructed from the Census of Man-
ufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures establishments, using establishments with 25+ years to
address sample selection. Grey shaded columns are the share of quarters in recession within a year.
recession started in quarter IV, and values of 1 and 0.5 in 2008 and 2009, respectively, as
the recession continued until quarter II in 2009. We find a coefficient of 0.064, which is
highly significant (a t-statistic of 6.9). Given that the mean of the S.D. of establishment
TFP shocks is 0.503, a year in recession is associated with a 13% increase in the dispersion
of TFP shocks. In the bottom panel, we report that this S.D. of establishment TFP shocks
also has a highly significant correlation with GDP growth of −045.
Our finding here of countercyclical dispersion of microlevel outcomes mirrors a range
of other recent papers such as Bachmann and Bayer (2014) in German data, Kehrig
(2015) in a similar sample of U.S. Census data, or Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2014),
Vavra (2014), and Berger and Vavra (2015) for different samples of U.S. firms. A num-
ber of these papers build alternative theories or interpretations of such patterns in the
microdata qualitatively distinct from our own, but the core empirical regularity of coun-
tercyclical microlevel dispersion is remarkably robust.
In columns 2 and 3, we examine the coefficient of skewness and kurtosis of TFP shocks
over the cycle and, interestingly, find no significant correlations.3 This suggests that reces-
sions can be characterized at the microeconomic level as a negative first-moment shock
plus a positive second-moment shock. In column 4, we use an outlier-robust measure of
cross-sectional dispersion, which is the IQR range of TFP shocks, and again find this rises
significantly in recessions. The point estimate on recession of 0.061 implies an increase of
over 15% in the IQR of TFP shocks in a recession year.4 In column 5, as another robust-
3This lack of significant correlation was robust in a number of experiments we ran. For example, if we drop
the time trend and Census survey year controls, the result in column 1 on the standard deviation remains highly
significant at 0.062 (0.020), while the results in columns 2 and 3 on skewness and kurtosis remain insignificant
at −0250 (0.243) and −0771 (2.755). We also experimented with changing the establishment selection rules
(keeping those with 2+ or 38+ years rather than 25+ years) and again found the results robust, as shown
in Appendix Table A1. Interestingly, Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2014) find an increase in left-skewness for
personal income growth during recessions, which may be absent in plant data because large negative draws
lead plants to exit. Because the drop in the left tail is the key driver of recessions in our model (the “bad news
principle” highlighted by Bernanke (1983)), this distinction is relatively unimportant.
4While 15% is a large increase in dispersion, it still greatly understates the increase in uncertainty in reces-
sion, because a large share of the dispersion of TFP is associated with measurement error. We formally address
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TABLE I
UNCERTAINTY IS HIGHER DURING RECESSIONSa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent S.D. of log(TFP) Skewness of Kurtosis of IQR of log(TFP) IQR of IQR of IQR of IQR of industrial
variable: shock log(TFP) log(TFP) shock output growth sales growth stock returns prod. growth
shock shock
Sample: Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants Public firms Public firms Industries
(manufact.) (manufact.) (manufact.) (manufact.) (manufact.) (all sectors) (all sectors) (manufact.)
Recession 0.064∗∗∗ −0.248 −1.334 0.061∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.191) (1.994) (0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean of dep. var. 0.503 −1.525 20.293 0.395 0.196 0.186 0.104 0.101
Corr. GDP growth −0.450∗∗∗ 0.143 0.044 −0.444∗∗∗ −0.566∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗
Frequency Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Quarterly Monthly Monthly
Years 1972–2011 1972–2011 1972–2011 1972–2011 1972–2011 1962:1–2010:3 1960–2010 1972–2010
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 191 609 455
Underlying sample 461,232 461,232 461,232 461,232 461,232 320,306 931,143 70,487
aEach column reports a time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) regression point estimate (and standard error below in parentheses) of a measure of uncertainty on a recession indicator. The
recession indicator is the share of quarters in that year in a recession in columns 1–5, whether that quarter was in a recession in column 6, and whether the month was in recession in columns 7 and 8.
Recessions are defined using the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) data. In the bottom panel we report the mean of the dependent variable and its correlation with real GDP growth. In
columns 1–5, the sample is the population of manufacturing establishments with 25 years or more of observations in the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) or Census of Manufactures (CM) survey
between 1972 and 2009, which contains data on 15,673 establishments across 40 years of data (one more year than the 39 years of regression data since we need lagged TFP to generate a TFP shock
measure). We include plants with 25+ years to reduce concerns over changing samples. In column 1, the dependent variable is the cross-sectional standard deviation (S.D.) of the establishment-level
shock to total factor productivity (TFP). This shock is calculated as the residual from the regression of log(TFP) at year t + 1 on its lagged value (year t), a full set of year dummies, and establishment
fixed effects. In column 2, we use the cross-sectional coefficient of skewness of the TFP shock, in column 3, the cross-sectional coefficient of kurtosis, and in column 4, the cross-sectional interquartile
range of this TFP shock as an outlier robust measure. In column 5, the dependent variable is the interquartile range of plants’ sales growth. In column 6, the dependent variable is the interquartile
range of firms’ sales growth by quarter for all public firms with 25 years (100 quarters) or more in Compustat between 1962 and 2010. In column 7, the dependent variable is the within firm-quarter
interquartile range of firms’ monthly stock returns for all public firms with 25 years (300 months) or more in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) between 1960 and 2010. Finally, in column
8, the dependent variable is the interquartile range of industrial production growth by month for manufacturing industries from the Federal Reserve Board’s monthly industrial production database.
All regressions include a time trend and for columns 1–5 Census year dummies (for Census year and for three lags). Robust standard errors are applied in all columns to control for any potential
serial correlation. ∗∗∗ denotes 1% significance, ∗∗ denotes 5% significance, and ∗ denotes 10% significance. Results are also robust to using Newey–West corrections for the standard errors. Data are
available at http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/RUBC.zip.
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ness test, we use plant-level output growth, rather than TFP shocks, and find a significant
rise in recessions. We also run a range of other experiments on different indicators, mea-
sures of TFP, and samples, and always find that dispersion rises significantly in recessions.5
For example, Figure A1 plots the correlation of plant TFP rankings between consecutive
years. This shows that during recessions these rankings churn much more, as increased
microeconomic variance leads plants to change their position within their industry-level
TFP rankings more rapidly.
In column 6, we use a different data set that is the sample of all Compustat firms with
25+ years of data. This has the downside of being a much smaller selected sample con-
taining only 2465 publicly quoted firms, but spanning all sectors of the economy, and
providing quarterly sales observations going back to 1962. We find that the quarterly dis-
persion of sales growth in this Compustat sample is also significantly higher in recessions.
One important caveat when using the variance of productivity “shocks” to measure un-
certainty is that the residual ejt is a productivity shock only in the sense that it is unfore-
casted by the regression equation (4), rather than unforecasted by the establishment. We
address this concern in two ways. First, in column 7 we examine the cross-sectional spread
of stock returns, which reflects the volatility of news about firm performance, and again
find this is countercyclical, echoing the prior results in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and
Xu (2001). In fact, as we discuss below in Table III, we also find that establishment-level
shocks to TFP are significantly correlated to their parent’s stock returns, so that at least
part of these establishment TFP shocks are new information to the market. Furthermore,
to remove the forecastable component of stock returns, we repeated the specification in
column 7 by first removing the quarter by firm mean of firm returns. This controls for any
quarterly factors—like size, market/book value, research and development (R&D) in-
tensity, and leverage—that may influence expected stock returns (e.g., Bekaert, Hodrick,
and Zhang (2012)), although of course the influence of common factors that may vary at
a higher frequency within the quarter may remain. The coefficient (standard error) on
recession in these regressions is 0.019 (0.003), similar to the results obtained in column 7.
Second, we extend the TFP forecast regressions (4) to include additional observables
that are likely to be informative about future TFP changes. Adding these in the regression
accounts for at least some of the superior information that the establishment might have
over the econometrician, helping us to back out true shocks to TFP from the perspec-
tive of the establishments. Figure 4 reports the IQR of the TFP shocks for the baseline
forecast regression, as well as for three other dispersion measures, where we sequentially
add more variables to the forecasting regressions that are used to recover TFP shocks.
First we add two extra lags in levels and polynomials of TFP, next we also include lags
and polynomials of investment, and finally we include lags and polynomials of multiple
inputs including employment, energy, and materials expenditure. As is clear from the fig-
ure, even when forward looking establishment choices for investment and employment
are included, the overall cyclical patterns of uncertainty are almost unchanged.
that in our SMM estimation framework. See Section 4.2 for estimates of the underlying increase in uncertainty
in recession and see Appendix C for details.
5For example, the IQR of employment growth rates has a point estimate (standard error) of 0.051 (0.012),
the IQR of TFP shocks measured using an industry-by-industry forecasting equation version of (4) has a point
estimate (standard error) of 0.064 (0.019), using 2+ year samples for the S.D. of TFP shocks, we find a point
estimate (standard error) of 0.046 (0.014), and using a balanced panel of 38+ year establishments, we find
a point estimate (standard error) of 0.075 (0.015). Finally, the IQR of TFP shocks measured after removing
firm–year means and then applying (4) has a point estimate (standard error) of 0.028 (0.011), so that dispersion
of productivity shocks even across plants within firms rises within recessions.
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FIGURE 4.—Robustness test: different measures of TFP “shocks” are all more dispersed in recessions.
Notes: Constructed from the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures establishments,
using establishments with 25+ years to address sample selection. Grey shaded columns are share of quarters in
recession within a year. The four lines are: Baseline: Interquartile Range of plant TFP “shocks” (as in Figure 3).
Add polynomials in TFP: includes the first, second and third lags of log TFP, and their degree 5 polynomials
in the AR regression which is used to recover TFP shocks. Add investment: includes all the controls from the
previous specification plus the first, second and third lags of investment rate, and their degree 5 polynomials.
Add emp, sales and materials: includes all the controls from the previous specification plus the second and third
lags of log employment, log sales, and log materials, as well as their degree 5 polynomials.
Finally, in column 8, we examine another measure of uncertainty, which is the cross-
sectional spread of industry-level output growth rates, finding again that this is strongly
countercyclical.
Hence, in summary plant-level (columns 1–5), firm-level (columns 6 and 7), and
industry-level (column 8) measures of volatility and uncertainty all appear to be strongly
countercyclical, suggesting that microeconomic uncertainty rises in recessions at all levels.
2.2. Industry Business Cycles and Uncertainty
In Table II, we report another set of results that disaggregate down to the industry
level, finding a very similar result that uncertainty is significantly higher during periods
of slower growth. To do this, we exploit the size of our Census data set to examine the
dispersion of productivity shocks within each SIC four-digit industry–year cell. The size
of the Census data set means that it has a mean (median) of 27.1 (17) establishments per
SIC four-digit industry–year cell, which enables us to examine the link between within-
industry dispersion of establishment TFP shocks and industry growth.
Table II displays a series of industry panel regressions in which our dependent variable
is the IQR of TFP shocks for all establishments in each industry (i)–year (t) cell. The
regression specification that we run is
IQRit = ai + bt + γ	yit 
The explanatory variable in column (1) (	yit) is the median growth rate of output be-
tween t and t + 1 in the industry–year cell, with a full set of industry (ai) and year (bt)
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TABLE II
UNCERTAINTY IS ALSO ROBUSTLY HIGHER AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL DURING INDUSTRY “RECESSIONS”a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: IQR of establishment TFP shocks within each industry–year cell
Specification: Baseline Median IQR of Median IQR of Median IQR of IQR of Industry
industry industry industry industry industry industry industry geographic
output output establishment establishment capital/labor capital/labor TFP spread spread
growth growth size size ratio ratio
Industry output growth −0.132∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.047) (0.024) (0.022) (0.034) (0.030) (0.041) (0.028)
Interaction of industry 0.822 0.882 −0.032 −0.033 −0.197 −0.265 0.123 0.007
output growth with (0.630) (0.996) (0.038) (0.026) (0.292) (0.330) (0.084) (0.122)
the variable in
specification row
Years 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009 1972–2009
Observations 16,451 16,451 16,451 16,451 16,451 16,451 16,451 16,451 16,451
Underlying sample 446,051 446,051 446,051 446,051 446,051 446,051 446,051 446,051 446,051
aEach column reports the results from an industry-by-year OLS panel regression, including a full set of industry and year fixed effects. The dependent variable in every column is the interquartile
range (IQR) of establishment-level TFP shocks within each SIC four-digit industry–year cell. The regression sample is the 16,451 industry–year cells of the population of manufacturing establishments
with 25 years or more of observations in the ASM or CM survey between 1972 and 2009 (which contains 446,051 underlying establishment years of data). These industry–year cells are weighted in the
regression by the number of establishment observations within that cell, with the mean and median number of establishments per industry–year cell equal to 27.1 and 17, respectively. The TFP shock
is calculated as the residual from the regression of log(TFP) at year t + 1 on its lagged value (year t), a full set of year dummies, and establishment fixed effects. In column 1, the explanatory variable
is the median of the establishment-level output growth in that industry–year. In columns 2–9, a second variable is also included that is an interaction of that explanatory variable with an industry-level
characteristic. In columns 2 and 3, this is the median and IQR of industry-level output growth, in columns 4 and 5 this is the median and IQR of industry-level establishment size in employees, in
columns 6 and 7, this is the median and IQR of industry-level capital/labor ratios, in column 8 this is the IQR of industry-level TFP levels (note the mean is zero by construction), while finally in
column 9, this interaction is the dispersion of industry-level concentration measured using the Ellison–Glaeser dispersion index. Standard errors clustered by industry are reported in brackets below
every point estimate. ∗∗∗ denotes 1% significance, ∗∗ denotes 5% significance, and ∗ denotes 10% significance.
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fixed effects also included. Column 1 of Table II shows that the within-industry dispersion
of TFP shocks is significantly higher when that industry is growing more slowly. Since the
regression has a full set of year and industry dummies, this is independent of the macroe-
conomic cycle. So at both the aggregate and the industry level, slowdowns in growth are
associated with increases in the cross-sectional dispersion of shocks.
This result raises the question of why the within-industry dispersion of shocks is higher
during industry slowdowns. To explore whether it is the case that industry slowdowns
impact some types of establishments differently, we proceed as follows. In columns 2–9,
we run a series of regressions to check whether the increase in within-industry dispersion
is larger given some particular characteristics of the industry. These are regressions of the
form
IQRit = ai + bt + γ	yit + δ	yit ∗ xi
where xi are industry characteristics (see Appendix A for details). Specifically, in column
2, we interact industry growth with the median growth rate in that industry over the full
period. The rationale is that perhaps faster growing industries are more countercyclical in
their dispersion? We find no relationship, suggesting long-run industry growth rates are
not linked to the increase in dispersion of establishment shocks they see in recessions.
Similarly, in column 3, we interact industry growth with the dispersion of industry growth
rates. Perhaps industries with a wide spread of growth rates across establishments are
more countercyclical in their dispersion? Again, we find no relationship. The rest of the
table reports similar results for the median and dispersion of plant size within each indus-
try (measured by the number of employees, columns 4 and 5), the median and dispersion
of capital/labor ratios (columns 6 and 7), and TFP and geographical dispersion interac-
tions (columns 8 and 9). In all of these we find insignificant coefficients on the interaction
of industry growth with industry characteristics.
Thus, to summarize, it appears that, first, the within-industry dispersion of establish-
ment TFP shocks rises sharply when the industry growth rates slow down, and, second,
perhaps surprisingly, this relationship appears to be broadly robust across all industries.
An obvious question regarding the relationship between uncertainty and the business
cycle is the direction of causality. Identifying the direction of causation is important in
highlighting the extent to which countercyclical macro-uncertainty and industry uncer-
tainty is a shock driving cycles versus an endogenous mechanism amplifying cycles. A re-
cent literature has suggested a number of mechanisms for uncertainty to increase en-
dogenously in recessions. See, for example, the papers on information collection by Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Tascherau-Dumouchel
(2017) or Chamley and Gale (1994), on experimentation in Bachmann and Moscarini
(2011), on forecasting by Orlik and Veldkamp (2015), on policy uncertainty by Lubos and
Veronesi (2013), and on search by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013). Our view is that
recessions appear to be initiated by a combination of negative first- and positive second-
moment shocks, with ongoing amplification and propagation from uncertainty move-
ments. So the direction of causality likely goes in both directions, and while we model
the causal impact of uncertainty in this paper, more work on the reverse (amplification)
direction would also be helpful.
2.3. Are Establishment-Level TFP Shocks a Good Proxy for Uncertainty?
The evidence we have provided for countercyclical aggregate and industry-level un-
certainty relies heavily on using the dispersion of establishment-level TFP shocks as a
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measure of uncertainty. To check this, Table III compares our establishment TFP shock
measure of uncertainty with other measures of uncertainty, primarily the volatility of daily
and monthly firm-stock returns, which have been used commonly in the prior uncertainty
literature.6 Importantly, we note that the goal of this section is to demonstrate the cor-
relation between the different measures of uncertainty. Thus, this section does not imply
any direction of causation.
In column 1 of Table III, we regress the mean absolute size of the TFP shock in the
plants of publicly traded firms against their parent firm’s within-year volatility of daily
stock returns (plus a full set of firm and year fixed effects). The positive and highly signif-
icant coefficient reveals that when plants of publicly quoted firms have large (positive or
negative) TFP shocks in any given year, their parent firms are likely to have significantly
more volatile daily stock returns over the course of that year. This is reassuring for both
our TFP shock measure of uncertainty and stock market volatility measures of uncer-
tainty, because while neither measure is ideal, the fact that they are strongly correlated
suggests that they are both proxies for an underlying measure of firm-level uncertainty. In
column 2, we use monthly returns rather than daily returns and find similar results, while
in column 3, following Leahy and Whited (1996), we leverage adjust the stock returns and
again find similar results.7
In column 4, we compare instead the within-year standard deviation of firm quarterly
sales growth against the absolute size of their establishment TFP shocks. We find again
a strikingly significant positive coefficient, showing that firms with a wider dispersion of
TFP shocks across their plants tend to have more volatile sales growth within the year.
Finally, in column 5, we generate an industry-level measure of output volatility within
the year by taking the standard deviation of monthly production growth, and we find that
this measure is also correlated with the average absolute size of establishment-level TFP
shocks within the industry in that year.
So in summary, establishment-level TFP shocks are larger when the parent firms have
more volatile stock returns and sales growth within the year, and the overall industry has
more volatile monthly output growth within the year. This suggests that these indicators
are all picking up some type of common movement in uncertainty.
2.4. Macroeconomic Measures of Uncertainty
The results discussed so far focus on establishing the countercyclicality of idiosyncratic
(establishment, firm, and industry) uncertainty. With respect to macroeconomic uncer-
tainty, existing work has documented that this measure is also countercyclical, including,
for example, Schwert (1989), Campbell et al. (2001), Engle and Rangel (2008), Jurado,
Ludvigson, and Ng (2014), and Stock and Watson (2012), or the survey in Bloom (2014).
Rather than repeat this evidence here, we simply include one additional empirical mea-
sure of aggregate uncertainty, which is the conditional heteroskedasticity of aggregate
productivity At . This is estimated using a generalized autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity GARCH(11) estimator on the Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) data
6See, for example, Leahy and Whited (1996), Schwert (1989), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), and
Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012).
7As we did in column 7 of Table I, to remove the forecastable component of stock returns, we repeat columns
1 and 3, first removing the quarter by firm mean of firm returns. After doing this the coefficient (standard error)
is very similar 0.324 (0.093) for column 1 and 0.387 (0.120) for column 3, mainly because the forecastable
component of stock returns explains very little of the total volatility in stock returns.
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TABLE III
CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT UNCERTAINTY MEASURES ARE CORRELATED WITH FIRM AND INDUSTRY TIME SERIES UNCERTAINTY MEASURESa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Mean of establishment absolute (TFP shock) within firm year Mean of establishment absolute (TFP shocks)
within industry year
Sample Establishments (in manufacturing) with a parent firm in compustat Manufacturing industries
Regression panel dimension Firm by year Industry by year
S.D. of parent daily stock 0.317∗∗∗
returns within year (0.091)
S.D. of parent monthly stock 0.275∗∗∗
returns within year (0.083)
S.D. of parent daily stock returns 0.381∗∗∗
within year, leverage adjusted (0.118)
S.D. of parent quarterly sales 0.134∗∗∗
growth within year (0.029)
S.D. of monthly industrial 0.330∗∗∗
production within year (0.060)
Fixed effects and clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Industry
Firms/industries 1838 1838 1838 1838 466
Observations 25,302 25,302 25,302 25,302 16,406
Underlying observations 172,074 172,074 172,074 172,074 446,051
aThe dependent variable is the mean of the absolute size of the TFP shock at the firm–year level (columns 1–4) and industry–year level (column 5). This TFP shock is calculated as the residual
from the regression of log(TFP) at year t + 1 on its lagged value (year t), a full set of year dummies, and establishment fixed effects, with the absolute size generated by turning all negative values
positive. The regression sample in columns 1–4 are the 25,302 firm–year cells of the population of manufacturing establishments with 25 years or more of observations in the ASM or CM survey
between 1972 and 2009 that are owned by Compustat (publicly listed) firms. This covers 172,074 underlying establishment years of data. The regression sample in column 5 is the 16,406 industry–year
cells of the population of manufacturing establishments with 25 years or more of observations in the ASM or CM survey between 1972 and 2009. The explanatory variables in columns 1–3 are the
annual standard deviation of the parent firm’s stock returns, which are calculated using the 260 daily values in columns 1 and 3 and the 12 monthly values in column 2. For comparability of monthly and
daily values, the coefficients and S.E. for the daily returns in columns 1 and 3 are divided by sqrt(21). The daily stock returns in column 3 are normalized by the (equity/(debt + equity)) ratio to control
for leverage effects. In column 4, the explanatory variable is the standard deviation of the parent firm’s quarterly sales growth. Finally, in column 5, the explanatory variable is the standard deviation
of the industry’s monthly industrial production data from the Federal Reserve Board. All columns have a full set of year fixed effects, with columns 1–4 also having firm fixed effects while column 5
has industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm/industry are reported in brackets below every point estimate. ∗∗∗ denotes 1% significance, ∗∗ denotes 5% significance, and ∗ denotes 10%
significance.
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on quarterly TFP growth from 1972Q1 to 2010Q4. We find that conditional heteroskedas-
ticity of TFP growth is strongly countercyclical, rising by 25% during recessions, which is
highly significant (a t-statistic of 6.1); this series is plotted in Appendix Figure A2.
3. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
We proceed by analyzing the quantitative impact of variation in uncertainty within a
DSGE model. Specifically, we consider an economy with heterogeneous firms that use
capital and labor to produce a final good. Firms that adjust their capital stock and em-
ployment incur adjustment costs. As is standard in the RBC literature, firms are subject
to an exogenous process for productivity. We assume that the productivity process has
an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. In addition to the standard first-moment
shocks considered in the literature, we allow the second moment of the innovations to
productivity to vary over time. That is, shocks to productivity can be fairly small in normal
times, but become potentially large when uncertainty is high.
3.1. Firms
3.1.1. Technology
The economy is populated by a large number of heterogeneous firms that employ cap-
ital and labor to produce a single final good. We assume that each firm operates a dimin-
ishing returns to scale production function with capital and labor as the variable inputs.
Specifically, a firm indexed by j produces output according to
yjt =Atzjtkαjtnνjt α+ ν < 1 (5)
Each firm’s productivity is a product of two separate processes: aggregate productivity,
At , and an idiosyncratic component, zjt . Both the macro- and firm-level components of
productivity follow autoregressive processes as noted in equations (2) and (3). We allow
the variance of innovations to the productivity processes, σAt and σ
Z
t , to vary over time
according to a two-state Markov chain.
3.1.2. Adjustment Costs
There is a wide literature that estimates labor and capital adjustment costs (e.g.,
Hayashi (1982), Nickell (1986), Caballero and Engel (1993), Caballero and Engel (1999),
Ramey and Shapiro (2001), Hall (2004), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Merz and
Yashiv (2007), and Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2015)). In what follows, we incor-
porate all types of adjustment costs that have been estimated in Bloom (2009) to be
statistically significant at the 5% level. As is well known in the literature, it is the pres-
ence of nonconvex adjustment costs that leads to a real options (wait-and-see effect) of
uncertainty shocks.
Capital Law of Motion. A firm’s capital stock evolves according to the standard law of
motion
kjt+1 = (1 − δk)kjt + ijt (6)
where δk is the rate of capital depreciation and ijt denotes investment.
Capital adjustment costs are denoted by ACk, and they equal the sum of (i) a fixed
disruption cost FK for any investment/disinvestment and (ii) a partial irreversibility resale
loss for disinvestment (i.e., the resale of capital occurs at a price that is only a share (1−S)
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of its purchase price). Formally,
ACk = I(|i|> 0)y(zAkn)FK + S|i|I(i < 0) (7)
Hours Law of Motion. The law of motion for hours worked is governed by
njt = (1 − δn)njt−1 + sjt (8)
where sjt denotes the net flows into hours worked and δn denotes the exogenous destruc-
tion rate of hours worked (due to factors such as retirement, illness, exogenous quits,
etc.).
Labor adjustment costs are denoted by ACn in total, and they equal the sum of (i) a
fixed disruption cost FL and (ii) a linear hiring/firing cost, which is expressed as a fraction
of the aggregate wage (Hw). Formally,
ACn = I(|s|> 0)y(zAkn)FL + |s|Hw (9)
Note that these adjustment costs in labor imply that njt−1 is a state variable for the firm.
3.1.3. The Firm’s Value Function
We denote by V (kn−1 z;AσAσZμ) the value function of a firm. The seven state
variables are given by (i) a firm’s capital stock, k, (ii) a firm’s hours stock from the pre-
vious period, n−1, (iii) the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity, z, (iv) aggregate productiv-
ity, A, (v) the current value of macro-uncertainty, σA, (vi) the current value of micro-
uncertainty, σZ , and (vii) the joint distribution of idiosyncratic productivity and firm-
level capital stocks and hours worked in the last period, μ, which is defined for the space
S =R+ ×R+ ×R+.
Denoting by primes the value of next period variables, the dynamic problem of the firm
consists of choosing investment and hours to maximize
V
(
kn−1 z;AσAσZμ
)
(10)
= max
in
⎧⎨
⎩
y −w(AσAσZμ)n− i
− ACk(kn−1 zk′;AσAσZμ)− ACn(kn−1 zn;AσAσZμ)
+E[m(AσAσZμ;A′σA′σZ′μ′)V (k′ n z′;A′σA′σZ′μ′)]
⎫⎬
⎭
given a law of motion for the joint distribution of idiosyncratic productivity, capital, and
hours,
μ′ = Γ (AσAσZμ) (11)
and the stochastic discount factor, m, which we discuss below in Section 3.4. The term
w(AσAσZμ) denotes the wage rate in the economy; K(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ) and
Nd(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ) denote the policy rules associated with the firm’s choice of
capital for the next period and current demand for hours worked.
3.2. Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households that we normalize
to a measure 1. Households choose paths of consumption, labor supply, and investment in
firm shares to maximize lifetime utility. We use the measure ψ to denote the one-period
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purchased shares in firms. The dynamic problem of the household is given by
W
(
AσAσZμ
)= max
{CNψ′}
{
U(CN)+βE[W (A′σA′σZ′μ′)]} (12)
subject to the law of motion for μ and a sequential budget constraint
C +
∫
q
(
k′ n z;AσAσZμ)dψ′(k′ n z)
≤w(AσAσZμ)N + ∫ ρ(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ)dμ(kn−1 z)
(13)
Households receive labor income as well as the sum of dividends and the resale value of
their investments priced at ρ(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ). With these resources the house-
hold consumes and buys new shares at a price q(k′ n z;AσAσZμ) per share of the
different firms in the economy. We denote by C(ψAσAσZμ), Ns(ψAσAσZμ),
and Ψ ′(k′ n z;AσAσZμ) the policy rules that determine current consumption, time
worked, and quantities of shares purchased in firms that begin the next period with a
capital stock k′ and who currently employ n hours with idiosyncratic productivity z.
3.3. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium in this economy is defined by a set of quantity
functions {CNsΨ ′KNd}, pricing functions {wqρm}, and lifetime utility and value
functions {WV }, where V and {KNd} are the value and policy functions, respectively,
that solve (10), while W and {CNsΨ ′} are, respectively, the value and policy functions
that solve (12). There is market clearing in asset markets
μ′
(
k′ n z′
)= ∫ ψ′(k′ n z)f (z′|z)dz
the goods market
C
(
ψAσAσZμ
)
=
∫ [
AzkαNd
(
kn−1 z;AσAσZμ
)ν − (K(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ)− (1 − δk)k)
−ACk(kK(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ))− ACn(n−1N(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ))
]
dμ(kn−1 z)
and the labor market
Ns
(
ψAσAσZμ
)= ∫ Nd(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ)dμ(kn−1 z)
Finally, the evolution of the joint distribution of z, k, and n−1 is consistent. That is,
Γ (AσAσZμ) is generated by K(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ), Nd(kn−1 z;AσAσZμ),
and the exogenous stochastic evolution of AzσZ and σA, along with the appropriate
integration of firms’ optimal choices of capital and hours worked given current state vari-
ables.
3.4. Sketch of the Numerical Solution
We briefly describe the solution algorithm, which heavily relies on the approach in Khan
and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel (2013). Fuller details are laid
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out in Appendix B, and the full code is available in the Supplementary Material (Bloom
et al. (2018)).
The model can be simplified substantially if we combine the firm and the household
problems into a single dynamic optimization problem. From the household problem, we
get
w = −UN(CN)
UC(CN)
 (14)
m= βUC
(
C ′N ′
)
UC(CN)
 (15)
where equation (14) is the standard optimality condition for labor supply and equation
(15) is the standard expression for the stochastic discount factor. We assume that the
momentary utility function for the household is separable across consumption and hours
worked,
U(CtNt)= C
1−η
t
1 −η − θ
Nχt
χ
 (16)
implying that the wage rate is given by
wt = θNχ−1t Cηt  (17)
We define the intertemporal price of consumption goods as p(AσZσAμ)≡UC(CN).
This then allows us to redefine the firm’s problem in terms of marginal utility, denoting
the new value function as V˜ ≡ pV . The firm problem can then be expressed as
V˜
(
kn−1 z;AσAσZμ
)
= max
{in}
{
p
(
AσAσZμ
)(
y −w(AσAσZμ)n− i− ACk − ACn)
+βE[V˜ (k′ n z′;A′σA′σZ′μ′)]
}

(18)
To solve this problem, we employ nonlinear techniques that build upon Krusell and Smith
(1998). Detailed discussion of the algorithm is provided in Appendix B, where we imple-
ment a range of alternative implementations of our Krusell–Smith type algorithm. Impor-
tantly, as we discuss in Appendix B, the main results remain robust across the different
alternatives we consider.
4. PARAMETER VALUES
In this section, we describe the quantitative specification of our model. To maintain
comparability with the RBC literature, we perform a standard calibration when possible
(see Section 4.1 and Table IV). However, the parameters that govern the uncertainty pro-
cess cannot be calibrated to match first moments in the U.S. data; neither have they been
previously estimated in the literature. As such, we adopt a simulated method of moments
(SMM) estimation procedure to choose these values in Section 4.2. In Section 5.2.3, we
explore the sensitivity of the results to different parameter values.
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TABLE IV
CALIBRATED MODEL PARAMETERSa
Preferences and Technology
β 0951/4 Annual discount factor of 95%
η 1 Unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Khan and Thomas (2008))
θ 2 Leisure preference, households spend 1/3 of time working
χ 1 Infinite Frisch elasticity of labor supply (Khan and Thomas (2008))
α 025 CRS production, isoelastic demand with 33% markup
ν 05 CRS labor share of 2/3, capital share of 1/3
ρA 095 Quarterly persistence of aggregate productivity (Khan and Thomas (2008))
ρZ 095 Quarterly persistence of idiosyncratic productivity (Khan and Thomas (2008))
Adjustment Costs
δk 26% Annual depreciation of capital stock of 10%
δn 88% Annual labor destruction rate of 35% (Shimer (2005))
FK 0 Fixed cost of changing capital stock (Bloom (2009))
S 339% Resale loss of capital in % (Bloom (2009))
FL 21% Fixed cost of changing hours in % of annual sales (Bloom (2009))
H 18% Per worker hiring/firing cost in % of annual wage bill (Bloom (2009))
aThe model parameters relating to preferences, technology, and adjustment costs are calibrated as referenced above.
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4.1. Calibration
Frequency and Preferences
We set the time period to equal a quarter. The household’s discount rate, β, is set
to match an annual interest rate of 5%. The variable η is set equal to 1, which im-
plies that the momentary utility function features an elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution of 1 (i.e., log preferences in consumption). Following Khan and Thomas (2008)
and Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel (2013), we assume that χ= 1. This assumption im-
plies that we do not need to forecast the wage rate in addition to the forecast of p in our
Krusell–Smith algorithm, since the household’s labor optimality condition with χ= 1 im-
plies that the wage is a function of p alone. We set the parameter θ such that households
spend about a third of their time working in the nonstochastic steady state.
Production Function, Depreciation, and Adjustment Costs
We set δk to match a 10% annual capital depreciation rate. Based on Shimer (2005),
we set the annual exogenous quit rate to 35%. We set the exponents on capital and labor
in the firm’s production function to be α= 025 and ν = 05, consistent with a capital cost
share of 1/3 of total input costs.
As previously discussed, the existing literature provides a wide range of estimates for
capital and labor adjustment costs. We use adjustment cost parameters from Bloom
(2009). The resale loss of capital amounts to 34%. The fixed cost of adjusting hours is
set to 21% of annual sales, and the hiring and firing costs equal 18% of annual wages.
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic TFP Processes
Productivity, both at the aggregate and the idiosyncratic level, is determined by AR(1)
processes as specified in equations (2) and (3). The serial autocorrelation parameters ρA
and ρZ are set to 0.95, similar to the quarterly value used by Khan and Thomas (2008).
4.2. Estimation
The Uncertainty Process
We assume that the stochastic volatility processes, σAt and σ
Z
t , follow a two-point
Markov chain:
σAt ∈
{
σAL σ
A
H
}
 where Pr
(
σAt+1 = σAj |σAt = σAk
)= πσAkj  (19)
σZt ∈
{
σZL σ
Z
H
}
 where Pr
(
σZt+1 = σZj |σZt = σZk
)= πσZkj  (20)
Since we cannot directly observe the stochastic process of uncertainty in the data, we pro-
ceed with SMM estimation. We formally discuss in Appendix C the estimation procedure
and all relevant details.
Since the empirical results in Section 2 suggested that microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic uncertainty co-move through the business cycle, we assume that a single process
determines the economy’s uncertainty regime. That is, our assumption of a single uncer-
tainty process implies that whenever microeconomic uncertainty is low (or high), so is
macroeconomic uncertainty. This assumption reduces the number of parameters govern-
ing the uncertainty process to six: σAL , σ
A
H , σ
Z
L , σ
Z
H , π
σ
LH , and π
σ
HL.
As the uncertainty process has a direct impact on observable cross-sectional and ag-
gregate time-series moments, it is natural that the SMM estimator minimizes the sum of
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TABLE V
ESTIMATED UNCERTAINTY PARAMETERSa
Quantity Estimate Standard Error
σAL 067 (0.098) Quarterly standard deviation of macroproductivity shocks (%)
σAH/σ
A
L 16 (0.015) Macrovolatility increase in high uncertainty state
σZL 51 (0.807) Quarterly standard deviation of microproductivity shocks (%)
σZH/σ
Z
L 41 (0.043) Microvolatility increase in high uncertainty state
πσLH 26 (0.485) Quarterly transition probability from low to high uncertainty (%)
πσHH 943 (16.38) Quarterly probability of remaining in high uncertainty (%)
aThe uncertainty process parameters are structurally estimated through an SMM procedure (see the main text and Appendix C
in the Supplemental Material). The estimation process targets the time-series moments of the cross-sectional interquartile range of
the establishment-level shock to estimated productivity in the Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures manufac-
turing sample, along with the time-series moments of estimated heteroskedasticity of the U.S. aggregate Solow residual based on a
GARCH(11) model. Both sets of target moments from the data are computed from 1972 to 2010.
squared percentage deviations of the following eight model and U.S. data moments: At
the microeconomic level, we target the (i) mean, (ii) standard deviation, (iii) skewness,
and (iv) autocorrelation of the time series of the cross-sectional interquartile range of es-
tablishment TFP shocks computed from our annual Census sample covering 1972–2010.
At the macrolevel, we target the same four moments based on the time series of estimated
heteroskedasticity using a GARCH(11) model for the annualized quarterly growth rate
of the U.S. Solow residual, covering 1972Q1–2010Q4. We display the estimated uncer-
tainty process parameters in Table V and the targeted moments in Table VI.
Based on this estimation procedure, we find that periods of high uncertainty occur with
a quarterly probability of 26%. The period of heightened uncertainty is estimated to be
persistent with a quarterly probability of 94% of staying in the high uncertainty state.
Aggregate volatility is 067% with low uncertainty and increases by approximately 60%
when an uncertainty shock arrives. Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated to equal 51% and
TABLE VI
UNCERTAINTY PROCESS MOMENTSa
Data Model
Macro-moments
Mean 336 358
Standard deviation 076 059
Skewness 083 118
Serial correlation 088 083
Micro-moments
Mean 3928 3844
Standard deviation 489 455
Skewness 116 081
Serial correlation 075 065
aThe microdata moments are calculated from the U.S. Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures sample
using annual data from 1972–2010. Microdata moments are computed from the cross-sectional interquartile range of the estimated
shock to establishment-level productivity, in percentages. The model micro-moments are computed in the same fashion as the data
moments, after correcting for measurement error in the data establishment-level regressions and aggregating to annual frequency. The
macrodata moments refer to the estimated heteroskedasticity from 1972–2010 implied by a GARCH(11) model of the annualized
quarterly change in the aggregate U.S. Solow residual, with quarterly data downloaded from John Fernald’s website. The model
macro-moments are computed from an analogous GARCH(11) estimation on simulated aggregate data. All model results are based
on a simulation of 1000 firms for 5000 quarters, discarding the first 500 periods.
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it increases by approximately 310% in the heightened uncertainty state. Table V reports
the point estimates and standard errors from the SMM estimation procedure. As the
table shows, most of these parameters are estimated precisely. However, in Section 5.2.3,
we discuss the robustness of our numerical results to modification of each of these six
parameters.
It is useful at this point to explain the large estimated increase in underlying fundamen-
tal microeconomic uncertainty σZt on the impact of an uncertainty shock in light of the
apparently more muted fluctuations of our microeconomic uncertainty proxy in Figure 3.
Although closely related and informative for one another, the two series are distinct. Cru-
cially, as we discuss in detail in our estimation Appendix C, the process of constructing our
cross-sectional data proxy for microeconomic uncertainty involves time aggregation from
quarterly to annual frequency, an unavoidable temporal mismatch of the measurement
of inputs and outputs within the year, as well as measurement error of productivity in the
underlying Census of Manufactures sample. In Appendix C, we demonstrate within the
model that each of these measurement steps leads to a reduction in the variability of the
uncertainty proxy relative to its mean level, with the temporal mismatch between input
and output measurement, as well as measurement error itself, accounting for the bulk of
the shift. The large increase in microeconomic uncertainty σZt , which we estimate upon
impact of an uncertainty shock, is critical for matching the behavior of measured produc-
tivity shock dispersion in the data. As Table VI demonstrates, the estimated model quite
closely captures the overall time-series properties of measured uncertainty in our data.
5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In what follows, we explore the quantitative implications of our model. We begin by
discussing the unconditional second moments generated by the model. We then continue
by specifically studying the effects of an uncertainty shock.
5.1. Business Cycle Statistics
Table VII illustrates that the model generates second-moment statistics that resemble
their empirical counterparts in U.S. data. We simulate the model over 5000 quarters us-
ing the histogram or nonstochastic simulation approach following Young (2010). We then
compute the standard set of business cycle statistics, after discarding an initial 500 quar-
ters. As in the data, investment and hours co-move with output. Output and consumption
co-move, although not as much as in the data. Investment is more volatile than output,
while consumption is less volatile. Given the high assumed Frisch elasticity of labor sup-
ply, the model also generates a realistic volatility of hours relative to output. See Rogerson
(1988), Hansen (1985), or Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) for a discussion of un-
derlying mechanisms that can generate more elastic labor supply in this class of models.
Overall, we conclude that the business cycle implications of our model are consistent with
the common findings in the literature.
5.2. The Effects of an Uncertainty Shock
As has been known since at least Scarf (1959), nonconvex adjustment costs lead to Ss
investment and hiring policy rules. Firms do not hire and invest until productivity reaches
an upper threshold (the S in Ss), and do not fire and disinvest until productivity hits a
lower threshold (the s in Ss). This is shown for labor in Figure 5, which plots the distribu-
tion of firms by their productivity/labor ratios, Az
n−1
, after the micro- and macro-shocks have
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TABLE VII
BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICSa
Data Model
σ(x) σ(x)
σ(x) σ(y) ρ(x y) σ(x) σ(y) ρ(x y)
Output 1.6 1.0 1.0 20 1.0 1.0
Investment 7.0 4.5 0.9 119 6.0 0.9
Consumption 1.3 0.8 0.9 09 0.4 0.5
Hours 2.0 1.3 0.9 24 1.2 0.8
aThe first panel contains business cycle statistics for quarterly U.S. data covering 1972Q1–2010Q4. The term σ(x) is the standard
deviation of the log variable, σ(y) is the standard deviation in log variable relative to the standard deviation of log output, and ρ(x y)
is the correlation of the log variable and log output. All business cycle data are current as of July 14, 2014. Output is real gross domestic
product (FRED GDPC1), investment is real gross private domestic investment (GPDIC1), consumption is real personal consumption
expenditures (PCECC96), and hours is total nonfarm business sector hours (HOANBS). The second panel contains business cycle
statistics from unconditional simulation of the estimated model, computed from a 5000-quarter simulation with the first 500 periods
discarded. All series are HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 1600, in logs expressed as percentages.
been drawn but before firms have adjusted. On the right is the firm-level hiring threshold
(right solid line) and on the left the firing threshold (left solid line), in the case of low
uncertainty. Firms to the right of the hiring line will hire, firms to the left of the firing line
will fire, and those in the middle will be inactive for the period.
An increase in uncertainty increases the returns to inaction, shown by the increased
hiring threshold (right dotted line) and reduced firing threshold (left dotted line). When
uncertainty is high, firms become more cautious as labor adjustment costs make it expen-
FIGURE 5.—The impact of an increase in uncertainty on the hiring and firing thresholds. Notes: The figure
plots the simulated cross-sectional marginal distribution of micro-level labor inputs after productivity shock
realizations and before labor adjustment. The distribution plots a representative period with average aggregate
productivity and low uncertainty levels. The vertical hiring and firing thresholds are computed based on firm
policy functions with average micro-level productivity realizations, taking as given the aggregate state of the
economy with low uncertainty (solid lines) and a high uncertainty counterfactual (dotted lines).
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sive to make a hiring or firing mistake. Hence, the hiring and firing thresholds move out,
increasing the range of inaction. This leads to a fall in net hiring, since the mass of firms
is right-shifted due to labor attrition. A similar phenomenon occurs with capital, whereby
increases in uncertainty reduce the amount of net investment.
5.2.1. Modelling a Pure Uncertainty Shock
To analyze the aggregate impact of uncertainty, we independently simulate 2500
economies, each of 100-quarter length. The first 50 periods are simulated unconditionally,
so all exogenous processes evolve normally. Then for each economy, after 50 quarters, we
insert an uncertainty shock by imposing a high uncertainty state. From the shock period
onward each economy evolves normally. To calculate the impulse response function to an
uncertainty shock for any macrovariable, we first compute the average of the aggregate
variable in each period t across simulated economies. The effect of an uncertainty shock
is then simply given by the percentage deviation of the average in period t from its value
in the pre-shock period.
Figure 6 depicts the impact of an uncertainty shock on output. For graphical purposes,
period 0 in the figure corresponds to the pre-shock period in the above discussion, that is,
quarter 50. Figure 6 displays a drop in output of just over 2.5% within one quarter. This
significant fall is one of the key results of this paper as it shows that uncertainty shocks can
be a quantitatively important contributor to business cycles within a general equilibrium
framework. A quick recovery follows the initial decline, and output returns to normal
levels within 1 year. We note that output then declines again moderately from quarters 6
onward. We defer the discussion for the intuition behind this result until Section 5.2.4.
These dynamics in output arise from the dynamics in three channels: labor, capital,
and the misallocation of factors of production. These are depicted in Figure 7. First, in
FIGURE 6.—The effects of an uncertainty shock. Notes: Based on independent simulations of 2500
economies of 100-quarter length. We impose an uncertainty shock in the quarter labelled 1, allowing normal
evolution of the economy afterwards. We plot the percent deviation of cross-economy average output from its
value in quarter 0.
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FIGURE 7.—Labor and investment drop and rebound, misallocation rises, and consumption overshoots
then falls. Notes: Based on independent simulations of 2500 economies of 100-quarter length. We impose an
uncertainty shock in the quarter labelled 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterwards. Clockwise
from the top left, we plot the percent deviations of cross-economy average labor, investment, consumption,
and the dispersion of the marginal product of labor from their values in quarter 0.
the top-left panel, we plot the time path of hours worked. When uncertainty increases,
most firms pause hiring, and hours worked begin to drop because workers are continuing
to attrit from firms without being replaced. In the model, this rate of exogenous attri-
tion is assumed to be constant over the cycle. This is consistent with Shimer (2005) and
Hall (2005), who show that around three-quarters of the movements in the volatility of
unemployment are due to job-finding rates and not to the cyclicality of the destruction
rate. Similarly, in the top-right panel, we plot the time path of investment, which drops
rapidly due to the increase in uncertainty. Since investment falls but capital continues to
depreciate, there is also a drop in the capital stock.
Misallocation of factor inputs—using the terminology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009)—
increases in the economy in response to an uncertainty shock. In normal times, unpro-
ductive firms contract and productive firms expand, helping to maintain high levels of
aggregate productivity. But when uncertainty is high, firms reduce expansion and con-
traction, shutting off much of this productivity-enhancing reallocation. In the bottom-left
panel, we plot the path of the dispersion of the marginal product of labor after an un-
certainty shock. More precisely, the bottom-left panel plots the impulse response of the
cross-sectional standard deviation of log( y
n
). In the wake of an uncertainty shock, labor
misallocation endogenously worsens, improving only slowly. In the longer run, labor, in-
vestment, misallocation, and output all start to recover to their steady state, as the uncer-
tainty shock is temporary. As uncertainty falls back, firms start to hire and invest again
to address their pent-up demand for labor and capital. In Figure B3 in the Supplemen-
tal Material, we depict alternative measures of misallocation. As Figure B3 shows, all of
these alternative measures point to the same result of increased misallocation following
an uncertainty shock.
In the lower-right panel of Figure 7, we plot the time profile of consumption. When the
uncertainty shock occurs, consumption jumps up in the first quarter before subsequently
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falling back below the mean of the ergodic distribution for several quarters. The logic
behind this initial increase in consumption is as follows. In the impact period of the un-
certainty shock, that is, period 1 in Figure 7, the households understand that the degree
of misallocation has increased in the economy as the bottom-left panel demonstrates. In-
creased misallocation acts as a negative first-moment shock to aggregate productivity and
thus lower the expected return on savings, making immediate consumption more attrac-
tive and thus leading to its first-period increase. Furthermore, this jump in consumption
is feasible since, in the impact period of the uncertainty shock, the freeze in both invest-
ment and hiring reduces the resources spent on capital and adjustment costs, thus freeing
up resources. After this initial jump, starting in period 2 in Figure 7, the capital stock is
now below its ergodic distribution, where we note that in the impact period of the un-
certainty shock, the pre-shock aggregate capital level was fixed. This fact, together with
hours worked being below their ergodic distribution and the degree of misallocation being
above its ergodic distribution, limits the overall resources in the economy and thus limits
consumption. In addition, the economy begins its recovery in period 2 in Figure 7, which
is manifested in investment and hiring beginning to increase relative to the values exhib-
ited during the impact period of the uncertainty shock. This recovery requires resources
to be spent on capital and adjustment costs, further reducing the available resources for
consumption. Interestingly, we note that Khan and Thomas (2013) find in their model
of credit constraints that while output, labor, and investment fall in response to a credit
tightening shock, in fact consumption, as in our model, also initially rises due to similar
general equilibrium effects.
Clearly, this rise in consumption at the start of recessions is an unattractive feature of
a pure uncertainty shock model of business cycles. Several options exist, however, to try
and address this. One is to allow consumers to save in other technologies besides capi-
tal, for example, in foreign assets. This is the approach Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011)
take in modelling risk shocks in small open economies. In an open economy model, a do-
mestic uncertainty shock induces agents to increase their savings abroad (capital flight).
In our closed model this is not possible, but extending the model to allow a foreign sec-
tor would make this feasible, although computationally more intensive. Another option
would be to use utility functions such as those in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman
(1988). Due to the complementarity between consumption and hours in such preference
structures, they should reduce the overshoot in consumption. We do not explore these
options for the following two reasons. Having another investment vehicle such as foreign
bond would add an additional state variable to the problem, and switching the prefer-
ence structure would require us to forecast wages separately from marginal utility. Both
changes would increase the computational burden considerably. Another option would be
to model precautionary behavior from households in the wake of an uncertainty shock, as
Basu and Bundick (2016) do in a new-Keynesian environment with demand-determined
output. Such behavior would allow for natural investment, consumption, and output co-
movement, but expanding the aggregate structure of the model to account for nominal
rigidities is beyond the scope of the current paper.
5.2.2. First-Moment and Second-Moment Shocks
Our quantitative results so far reveal that uncertainty shocks can contribute importantly
to recessions, but there are at least two unattractive implications of modelling an uncer-
tainty shock in isolation. First, the empirical evidence in Section 2 suggests that recessions
are periods of both first- and second-moment shocks, at least to the extent that the aver-
age growth rates of TFP and output decrease and their variances increase. Second, in our
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FIGURE 8.—Adding a −2% first-moment shock increases the output fall and eliminates a consumption
overshoot. Notes: Based on independent simulations of 2500 economies of 100-quarter length. For the base-
line (× symbols) we impose an uncertainty shock in the quarter labelled 1. For the uncertainty and TFP shock
( symbols), we also impose an aggregate productivity shock with average equal to −2%, allowing normal evo-
lution of the economy afterwards. Clockwise from the top left, we plot the percent deviations of cross-economy
average output, labor, consumption, and investment from their values in quarter 0.
model, uncertainty shocks are associated with an increase in consumption on impact and
a reduction in disinvestment and firing (see Figures 5 and 7).
Thus, to generate an empirically more realistic simulation, we consider the combination
of an uncertainty shock and a −2% exogenous first-moment shock. See Appendix B for a
discussion of the specific numerical experiment considered here.
As Figure 8 suggests, this additional shock magnifies the drop in output, investment,
and hours. The addition of the first-moment shock also leads to a fall in consumption on
impact. Given the business cycle co-movement we observe empirically, we conclude that
simultaneous first- and second-moment shocks in the model can generate dynamics that
resemble recent U.S. recessions.
5.2.3. Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our finding to different parameterizations.
We first consider the robustness of our results with respect to the estimated parameters
governing the uncertainty process. Since the estimated values in Section 4.2 pointed to
(i) a significant jump in both micro- and macro-uncertainty, (ii) a significant persistence
of the uncertainty process, and (iii) a moderately high frequency of high uncertainty,
we consider experiments where we reduce the values of each of these parameters. For
consistency, unless otherwise noted, every robustness experiment considers a reduction
of 25% in the parameter value. Thus, within this set we consider (i) a reduction of the
macrovolatility jump, σ
A
H
σAL
, from 16 to 12, (ii) a reduction of the microvolatility jump, σ
z
H
σzL
,
from 413 to 310, (iii) a reduction in the likelihood of transition from low uncertainty to
high uncertainty, πσLH , from 0026 to 002, and (iv) a reduction in the uncertainty per-
sistence, πσHH , from 094 to 071. Finally, we also consider two additional experiments
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FIGURE 9.—The impact of an uncertainty shock is robust to a wide range of alternative calibrations. Notes:
Based on independent simulations of 2500 economies of 100-quarter length. For all simulations we impose an
uncertainty shock in the quarter labelled 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterwards. Baseline
(× symbols) is the estimated baseline path. Other paths plot responses assuming a reduction in low-uncer-
tainty micro volatility (σZL , ◦ symbols), the high-uncertainty increase in micro volatility (σZH/σZL ,  symbols),
low-uncertainty macro volatility (σAL , + symbols), the high-uncertainty increase in macro volatility (σAH/σAL , ∗
symbols), the frequency of an uncertainty shock (πσLH , stars), the persistence of an uncertainty shock (π
σ
HH ,
 symbols), all adjustment costs for labor and capital ( symbols). Clockwise from the top left, we plot the
percent deviations of cross-economy average output, labor, consumption, and investment from their values in
quarter 0.
where (i) we lower the microvolatility baseline value, σzL, from 0051 to 0038 and (ii) we
lower macrovolatility baseline value, σAL , from 00067 to 00050. Figure 9 plots the effects
of each of these variations on output, investment, labor, and consumption. As Figure 9
suggests, the results are overall robust to these changes, preserving the dynamics reported
in Figures 6–8. The one exception is the reduction in the persistence of the uncertainty
shock to 0.7 from the estimated value of 0.94. At lower levels of persistence, the impact is
short-lived. This highlights how the dynamics of the impact of uncertainty shocks are sen-
sitive to the persistence of the underlying shock and is another motivation for our SMM
estimation of the parameters of the uncertainty process. We note that the estimated value
of 0.94 for the autocorrelation of uncertainty may seem high. However, this potentially
accounts for the endogenous amplification of uncertainty from slower growth proposed
by a range of other papers.
In addition to systematically plotting robustness checks to changes in the value of each
of our six estimated uncertainty process parameters, Figure 9 also plots the results from
one additional experiment in which we reduce the value of all capital and labor adjust-
ment cost parameters by 25% simultaneously. The effect of an uncertainty shock changes
little relative to our baseline, a result that reflects the fact, well known within the liter-
ature on investment and adjustment costs, that the sizes of inaction regions are concave
functions of adjustment costs. For example, see the analytical results in Dixit (1995) and
Abel and Eberly (1996) that show that the size of the inaction region for investment in
their models expands to the third or fourth order in adjustment costs around zero.
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FIGURE 10.—The impact of an uncertainty shock combines Oi–Hartman–Abel, real options and consump-
tion smoothing effects. Notes: Based on independent simulations of 2500 economies of 100-quarter length.
For all simulations we impose an uncertainty shock in the quarter labelled 1, allowing normal evolution of the
economy afterwards. GE, adjustment costs (× symbols) is the baseline, and the PE responses are partial equi-
librium paths with adjustment costs (+ symbols) and without adjustment costs (◦ symbols). Clockwise from
the top left, we plot the percent deviations of cross-economy average output, labor, consumption, and invest-
ment from their values in quarter 0. Note that PE economies have no consumption concept, with deviations
therefore set to 0.
5.2.4. Decomposing the Impact of Uncertainty
The next set of robustness results studies how the effects of uncertainty shocks differ
across general equilibrium (GE) and partial equilibrium (PE) frameworks. To address
this question, we plot in Figure 10 the impact of an uncertainty shock in three different
economies. The line with × symbols depicts again the effects of an uncertainty shock
in our GE model economy, the line with + symbols depicts the same response but with
PE only (all prices and wages are held constant and the consumer side of the economy
is ignored), while the line with ◦ symbols depicts the effects of an uncertainty shock in
a PE economy with no adjustment costs at all. Note that in the bottom-right panel in
the PE economies, consumption is not defined because there is no notion of an aggre-
gate household. We therefore impose a zero response path for consumption in those
cases.
When there are no adjustment costs of any type in a PE economy, output actually in-
creases following an uncertainty shock. The reason for this result is related to the Oi
(1961), Hartman (1972), and Abel (1983) effect, whereby a higher variance of productiv-
ity increases investment, hiring, and output because the optimal capital and labor choices
are convex in productivity.
By contrast, the addition of adjustment costs to the PE setup dramatically changes the
effect of an uncertainty shock. Now, on impact there is a fall in aggregate output. The
reason is that the increase in uncertainty moves firms’ labor and capital Ss bands out,
temporarily pausing hiring and investment. If all firms pause hiring and investment, ag-
gregate labor and capital drop due to labor attrition and capital depreciation. But this
pause is short-lived, as once uncertainty drops back, firms start to hire and invest again.
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So in the medium run, the Oi–Hartman–Abel effect dominates and output rises above its
long-run trend.
While these forces are also present in the baseline GE adjustment cost economy, the
curvature in the utility function, that is, the endogenous movement in the interest rate,
moderates the rebound and overshoot. The overshoot in the PE economy requires big
movements in investment and labor, which are feasible since consumption is not taken
into account in the PE framework. However, in the GE framework, the curvature in utility
slows down the rebound of the GE economy, generating a smoother and more persistent
output cycle. Intriguingly, in the first period, however, GE has very little impact on output
relative to the PE economy with adjustment cost. This is because the Ss bands have moved
so far out that there is a reduced density of firms near the hiring or investment thresholds
to respond to prices. Hence, the short-run robustness of the impact of uncertainty shocks
to GE suggested by Bloom (2009) seems to be present, while the medium-run sensitivity
to GE highlighted by Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) is also present.
We are now in position to discuss the reason for the sluggish behavior of output in
the medium term after an uncertainty shock in Figure 6. First, on impact in periods 1
and 2, the “real options” effect due to the uncertainty shock dominates, leading to a
hiring/investment freeze, misallocation, and, thus, a significant drop in output. Later on
in periods 3–5, the economy exhibits a “rebound” as the high microvolatility is realized
and some firms draw significantly higher productivity shocks than before. Firms start to
readjust and the Oi–Hartman–Abel effect leads to a recovery. During the third stage
starting in periods 6–8, output declines again.
Two factors play a role in the second fall in output. First, the level of misallocation
remains high, which acts as a drag on output and is a large contributor to the slowdown of
the recovery. The bottom-left panel of Figure 7 reveals that the cross-sectional dispersion
of the marginal product of labor—a measure of labor misallocation—remains almost 10%
higher in period 6 and declines only slowly as firms begin to adjust their inputs again in the
wake of an uncertainty shock. Underlying misalignment of inputs and productivity at the
microlevel prevents effective use of the capital and labor stock of the aggregate economy,
and meaningful input adjustment costs prevent such misallocation from resolving itself
quickly over this period.
The second factor contributing to the second more gradual decline in output is a de-
clining path for investment starting around period 6. By this stage, the real options effect
has subsided in large part and the economy has a low but growing consumption path.
This results in a declining path of interest rates over which it is optimal to have a de-
clining investment path. These investment dynamics of the economy in the third stage of
the response to an uncertainty shock resemble those that show up in a basic neoclassical
growth model as in Brock and Mirman (1972). Figure D1 in the Supplemental Material
plots the response of such an economy to a capital destruction shock. As the figure shows,
consumption converges from below at a declining rate, and investment declines over the
path.
5.2.5. Laws of Motion Robustness
Our final set of robustness checks studies the impact of variations in the labor and
capital depreciation rates. In these experiments we vary one by one the capital deprecia-
tion rate and the labor depreciation rate by one quarter each. The results are depicted in
Figure 11. As the figure suggests, unsurprisingly reduction of the labor depreciation rate
attenuates the fall in hours and thus in output but preserves the overall dynamics found in
the benchmark calibration. Changes in the capital depreciation rate do not change the fall
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FIGURE 11.—The impact of an uncertainty shock is reduced by lower rates of capital depreciation or labor
attrition. Notes: Based on independent simulations of 2500 economies of 100-quarter length. For all simu-
lations we impose an uncertainty shock in the quarter labelled 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy
afterwards. Baseline (× symbols) is the estimated baseline path. The two other paths plot responses assuming
a 25% reduction in the capital depreciation rate (◦ symbols) and labor depreciation rate (+ symbols). Clock-
wise from the top left, we plot the percent deviations of cross-economy average output, labor, consumption,
and investment from their values in quarter 0.
on impact, which is driven by the behavior in labor. Later on, a lower capital depreciation
rate accentuates the recovery from an uncertainty shock as it induces a strong rebound
in investment leading to an increase in capital and thus in labor and output. However,
we note that the more empirically relevant exercise is to increase the capital depreciation
rate, since investment is increasingly shifting toward intangible areas, which have much
higher depreciation rates. For example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) migra-
tion of R&D from the satellite accounts to the fixed assets tables is based on depreciation
rates of around 20% or higher (Li (2012)). Thus, while the reduction in annual deprecia-
tion does reduce the impact of an uncertainty shock, the empirically relevant depreciation
rate in the economy is likely much higher.
6. POLICY IN THE PRESENCE OF UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we analyze the effects of stimulative policies in the presence of uncer-
tainty shocks. It is important to emphasize that any such policy is not optimal within the
context of our model, as the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Rather, we see
our policy experiments as a means to document and quantify the effects of such policies
in times of heightened uncertainty. It is also worth noting that this ignores the direct im-
pact of policy on uncertainty as studied by papers such as Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)
and Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2017).
The policy experiment we consider is a policy that attempts to temporarily stimulate
hiring by reducing the effective wage paid by firms. More specifically, the policy consists
of an unanticipated 1% wage bill subsidy paid for one quarter and financed through a
lump-sum tax on households. We simulate this policy impulse once during an uncertainty
shock and also in an economy that is not hit by an uncertainty shock. By comparing the
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FIGURE 12.—Policy is less effective in the aftermath of an uncertainty shock. Notes: Based on independent
simulations of 2500 economies of 100-quarter length. For a wage subsidy in normal times (black bar, left),
we provide an unanticipated 1% wage bill subsidy to all firms in quarter 1, allowing the economy to evolve
normally thereafter. We also simulate an economy with no wage subsidy in quarter 1. The bar height is the
percentage difference between the cross-economy average subsidy and no subsidy output paths in quarter 1.
For the wage subsidy with an uncertainty shock (red bar, right), we repeat the experiment but simultaneously
impose an uncertainty shock in quarter 1.
marginal effect in those two cases, we attempt to identify the effect of uncertainty on
policy effectiveness.
Figure 12 depicts this experiment as it shows the net impact of the policy. That is, we
first solve for the effects of the policy on output when it does not coincide with an uncer-
tainty shock. Subtracting from this the behavior of output when there is no uncertainty
shock and no subsidy yields the net impact of the policy in the absence of an uncertainty
shock. We then solve for the policy’s effect when it does coincide with an uncertainty
shock. Similarly, subtracting from this latter experiment the behavior of output when
there is an uncertainty shock and no subsidy, the behavior depicted in Figure 6 yields
the net impact of the policy in the presence of an uncertainty shock. As Figure 12 shows,
the presence of uncertainty reduces the effects of the wage policy by over two-thirds on
impact. The reason is that as soon as uncertainty rises, the Ss thresholds jump out, so
many firms are far away from their hiring and investment thresholds, making them less
responsive to any policy stimulus. Our results here echo findings from the lumpy invest-
ment literature on the procyclicality of the investment response to productivity shocks
(e.g., Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel (2013)). In particular, we show that uncertainty
or second-moment shocks in addition to first-moment shocks can also generate move-
ment in the responsiveness of the economy to shocks. Interestingly, in the context of a
new-Keynesian economy with a distinct structure and policy experiment, Vavra (2014)
also finds that second-moment shocks reduce the responsiveness of the economy to pol-
icy.
Overall, our results highlight how uncertainty shocks lead to time-varying policy ef-
fectiveness. At the instant an uncertainty shock hits, policy is not as effective relative to
normal times. Hence, uncertainty shocks not only impact the economy directly, but also
indirectly change the response of the economy to any potential reactive stabilization pol-
icy.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Uncertainty has received substantial attention as a potential factor in business cycles.
The first part of this paper uses Census microdata to show that measured uncertainty is
indeed strongly countercyclical. This is true both at the aggregate and the industry level:
slower industry growth is associated with higher industry uncertainty.
The second part of the paper then builds a DSGE model with heterogeneous firms,
time-varying uncertainty, and adjustment costs to quantify the impact of second-moment
shocks. We find that uncertainty shocks typically lead to drops of about 2.5% in GDP,
with a sharp drop, quick recovery, and then continued sluggishness in output. This sug-
gests that uncertainty could play an important role in driving business cycles, either as an
impulse or amplification mechanism. We also find that because uncertainty makes firms
cautious, the response of the economy to stimulative policy substantially declines. Finally,
both our empirical and simulation results suggest recessions are best modelled as a com-
bination of a negative first-moment and a positive second-moment shock.
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